



DCS/CSCI 2350:
Social & Economic
Networks

*Games and game theory:
A brief introduction*

Reading: Ch. 6 of EK

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1

Game Theory

- “Game”
Ernst Zermelo (1913):
In any chess game that does not end in a draw, a player has a winning strategy
- Mathematical theory of strategic decision making
John von Neumann (1944)



2

Applications

- Application: market equilibria
 - Predict where the market is heading to
- Mechanism design and auctions
 - Keyword search auction by Google, Microsoft, ...
 - Spectrum allocation among wireless companies

3

Applications

Understanding the Internet: “Selfish routing” is a constant-factor off from optimal



4

Applications

- Load balancing and resource allocation
- p2p and file sharing systems
- Cryptography and security
- Social and economic networks, etc.

5


Applications: my own research

- Game-theoretic modeling
- Machine learning
- Inference
- Example: threshold models for networks connecting strategic agents


6

Influence games (Irfan & Ortiz, 2014)

- Thresholds are heterogeneous
- Directed, asymmetric network
- Each edge: labeled with influence factor
- Relationships can be positive or negative
- Initial adopters or *seeds*



7



8

The Power Of Context in Networks: Ideal Point Models with Social Interactions

AAMAS 2018, Sweden

With Tucker Gordon'17

[Paper Link](#)



Best Paper Award

9

Spheres Of Legislation: Polarization And Most Influential Nodes In Behavioral Context

Complex Networks 2019, Portugal and
Computational Social Networks Journal


[Paper Link](#)

With Andrew Phillips'19 &


Luca Ostertag-hill'20



10



11



12



Discussion:

- game
- best response
- dominant strategy
- Nash equilibrium (NE)
- pure-strategy NE (PSNE)

13

Example: Split or Steal

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yM38mRHY150>

- Rules of the game
- Outcome



14

Game model of split or steal

- One-shot game (simultaneous move)
- 3 components
 - Players
 - Strategies/actions
 - Payoffs

15


		Lucy	
		Split	Steal
Tony	Split	\$33K, \$33K	Frust., \$66K
	Steal	\$66K, Frustr.	\$0, \$0

16

Why did they end up with 0?

		Lucy	
		Split	Steal
Tony	Split	\$33K, \$33K	Frustr., \$66K
	Steal	\$66K, Frustr.	\$0, \$0

Nash Equilibrium
Everyone plays their best response to others simultaneously



John F. Nash
Nobel Prize, 1994

17

Best response

- Best strategy of a player, given the other players' strategies
- Always exists!

18

(Strictly/weakly) dominant strategy

- A strategy of a player that is (strictly/weakly) better than any of their other strategies, no matter what the other players do
- Does not always exist

19

Famous example: prisoner's dilemma

		Suspect 2	
Payoff matrix		Not Confess	Confess
Suspect 1	Not Confess	-1, -1	-10, 0
	Confess	0, -10	-4, -4

20

Drug usage in cycling

		Cyclist 2	
		No Drugs	Drugs
Cyclist 1	Payoff matrix		
	No Drugs	3, 3	1, 4
	Drugs	4, 1	2, 2

21

Example

		Column Player	
		L	R
Row Player	Payoff matrix		
	U	10, 50	5, 0
	D	0, 0	5, 10

(Weakly) dominant strategy → U
 Neither is a dominant strategy → R

22

Checkpoint

- What is the difference between a dominant strategy and a best response?
- What is the difference between weakly and strictly dominant strategies? Will a player always have one?

23

Discussion:

- game
- best response
- dominant strategy
- Nash equilibrium (NE)
- pure-strategy NE (PSNE)

24

Nash equilibrium (NE)

- A joint strategy (one strategy/player) s.t. every player plays their best response to others simultaneously
- (Equiv.) A joint strategy s.t. no player gains by deviating unilaterally
 - Useful for checking whether a joint strategy is a NE

26

Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)

- Players do not use any probability in choosing strategies as they do in "mixed-strategy"
- Every player plays their best response to others simultaneously

27

Checkpoint

- What is the difference between best response and PSNE?
- Is there a connection between dominant strategy and PSNE?

28

Quiz

- Watch the following clip from the movie *a Beautiful Mind* portraying Nash's discovery of NE
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJS7lgvk6ZM>
- Is this actually a Nash equilibrium?
 - **Detailed answer:** A [blog post](#) (also posted on the class website)

31

Misconceptions

- Equilibrium signifies a tie/draw/balance
- Equilibrium outcome is the best possible outcome for all players (*A Beautiful Mind*)
- Self-interested players want to hurt each other

32

Questions

- Does NE always exist? (Answer later ...)
- If it exists, is it unique?

33



Games with multiple NE

1. Battle of the sexes (Coordination)
2. Hawk-dove game (anti-coordination)

34



Does NE always exist?

Mixed-strategy NE
(MSNE)

36

Penalty kick game



42

42

Penalty kick game (continued)



43

43

Penalty kick game (continued)



44

44

Penalty kick game (real-world)

- “Professionals Play Minimax”- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta

Equilibrium probabilities (computed by solving equations)
match real-world probabilities from data!

		Goalkeeper	
		Left (0.42)	Right (0.58)
Shooter	Left (0.38)	0.58, 0.42	0.95, 0.05
	Right (0.62)	0.93, 0.07	0.70, 0.30

From real-world data

<https://bleacherreport.com/articles/755195-champions-league-08-analyzing-one-of-the-most-iconic-shootouts-in-history>

46

Von Neumann's Theorem (1928)

- Every finite 2-person zero-sum game has a mixed equilibrium



John von Neumann (1903 – 1957)

48

Theorem of Nash (1950)

Every finite game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies



John F. Nash (1928 – 2015)
Nobel Prize, 1994

49

Key take-away messages

- Players act simultaneously, but NE outcome is stable in the sense that there is no incentive for unilateral deviation.
- There is always at least one MSNE (including PSNE). A PSNE is not guaranteed.
- The concept of NE doesn't say how NE happens.
- NE is not a balance or tie. It is often times a socially-inefficient outcome.